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Abstract
We study an OLG model in which the average income of the society acts as a reference
point for the agents’ utility on consumption. To model this we use the functional form
developed in behavioral economics to study reference-dependence: prospect theory. We
then assume that: 1) the utility function is convex in an interval before the reference
point; 2) the utility function is not differentiable at the reference point, and it is steeper
below than above the reference point. We argue that this reference-dependence causes
the economy to admit multiple equilibria, and we show that in any of these equilibria in
finite time the wealth distribution will become, and remain, either polarized or of perfect
equality. We then study growth rates and show that, if we look at the equilibria with the
highest growth, then the society that grows the most is the one that starts with perfect
equality. If we look at the equilibria with the lowest growth for each economy, however,
then the society with a small amount of initial inequality is the one that grows (strictly)
the most, while a society with perfect equality is the one that grows the least. All of
these growth rates are weakly higher than the growth rate of a corresponding economy
without reference-dependence.
JEL classification numbers:
Key words: Aspirations, Interdependent Preferences, Reference-dependence, inequality
and growth
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1. Introduction
1.1 Basic Idea
While the traditional approach in economic modeling is to assume that individual pref-
erences are a fixed ordering irrespective of the environment in which agents operate,
many arguments have been put forth in many branches of economics to question this
assumption. On the one hand, for example, it has been frequently argued both in the
development and in macro-economic literature that how much utility subjects assign to a
certain bundle, or to a certain achievement, might fundamentally depend on the behavior
of the rest of the society. In particular, individulas might form aspirations about what
that they would like to accomplish based on the behavior they observe in others, like
their parents, their neighbors, or the whole society. This feature could naturally have
strong implications. For example, Appadurai (2005) and Ray (2006) suggest how aspi-
rations could play both a positive and a negative role in the development of a country:
they might induce subjects to ‘work hard’ to reach their aspirations; at the same time,
individuals who are too far from reaching them might simply ‘give up.’
On the other hand, it is now an established finding in behavioral and experimental
economics that the utility that subjects associate to the different available alternatives
often depends on some reference point – some amount, or object, that subjects compare
the available options with in order to make a choice.1 These reference-effects have been
shown to have an enormous impact on agent’s decisions, and have spurred the develop-
ment of a large literature aimed at identifying the correct functional form to represent
∗Any opinion expressed in this paper is under full responsibility of the author and should never be
interpreted as an official position by the European Commission.
1See among others, Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and
Kahneman (1981), Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), Camerer (1995).
it.2 Among these, on of the most well-known model is Prospect Theory, discussed in
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991), whose functional
form has three main features. First, it is reference-dependent – the utility of the agent
depends on her reference point. Second, the utility function is “steeper for losses than
for gains:” in particular, the utility function has a kink at the reference point, where the
left derivative is higher than the right derivative – generating a behavior known as ‘loss
aversion.’ Finally, the utility function is concave above the reference point, but convex
below the reference point – a feature sometimes referred to as ‘diminishing sensitivity.’
While prospect theory is agnostic about the origin of the reference point, with few ex-
ceptions the literature has focused only on the cases in which the reference point is either
agent’s past consumption, or her expectations.
The goal of this papers is study the role of aspirations in development by merging
these two different approaches. In particular, we follow the intuition suggested in the
development literature about the role of the society in affecting subjects’ aspirations: we
focus on the case in which the aspirations of each household are the average income of the
rest of the society. At the same time, we use the functional form developed in behavioral
economics, prospect theory, to model such reference-dependence.
1.2 Our results
We study a warm-glove overlapping generations model in which the utility that house-
holds derive in the second period of their lives depends on the average income of the other
member of the society during that period, x¯t. Following prospect theory, we assume that
the utility function is convex in an interval that ends with x¯t, and that it has a kink (it
is not differentiable) at x¯t, where the left-derivative is higher than the right-derivative.
Everything else in the model is entirely standard.
We obtain the following results. First, we argue that this economy has multiple equi-
libria, where the multiplicity is mostly due to the presence of these reference effects.
Despite this multiplicity, however, all the equilibria have a common feature: there is a
finite period T after which the wealth distribution of the economy is either of perfect
equality or polarized, and so it will remain for all subsequent periods.3 No other dis-
tribution is possible in the long run, and one of these distributions must be reached in
finite time (as opposed to asymptotically, or in steady state). Furthermore, we show
that whether the economy converges to one distribution or the other depends both on
the initial distribution, and on the equilibrium that we are looking at. On the one hand,
2For theoretical behavioral models see Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman
(1991), Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006). For axiomatic models, see Chateauneuf and Wakker (1999), Masatli-
oglu and Ok (2005, 2008), Diecidue and Van de Ven (2008), Ok et al. (2009), Ortoleva (2010), and
Wakker (2010).
3By a polarized distribution we understand a distribution with a ‘gap in the middle’, i.e. a wealth
distribution such that there is an interval in the interior of the support which contains zero mass. The
idea is that the wealthy will lay above this gap, while the poor will lay below.
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every society with a non-degenerate initial distribution has an equilibrium in which the
wealth distribution will become polarized in the long run. On the other hand, a society
that has an initial distribution that is very ‘concentrated’ (the difference between the
average and the poorest household is ‘small’) will also have an equilibrium in which the
wealth distribution converges to perfect equality in finite time.
We then study how the initial distribution of endowments affects the relative growth
of societies with aspirations. First, we show that if we focus on the equilibria with the
highest growth for each economy, fixing the average income the economy that grows the
most is the one with an initial distribution of perfect equality.
If we look at the equilibria with the lowest growth for each society, however, things
might change considerably: the society that grows the most is the one with some initial
inequality, but that admits an equilibrium of perfect equality. In particular, this economy
will grow strictly more than an economy that starts from perfect equality – the latter
will grow just like an economy without reference dependence in this equilibrium. That
is, we show that if we focus on the equilibria with the lowest growth, then ‘a little bit’
of initial inequality is good for growth.
We also show that if the utility exhibits Constant Relative Risk Aversion, then any
society with reference-dependence grows (weakly) more than a standard economy with
the same initial endowment but without reference-dependence. Put differently, we show
that the presence of reference-dependence in the form of aspirations cannot be bad for
growth.
1.3 Outline and Related Literature
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical
model, the notion of equilibrium that we use, and describes the optimal choice of the
households in this environment. Section 3 presents the consequences of this reference-
dependence on the wealth distribution of the society in the long run, while Section 4
analyses those on growth. Section 5 concludes. The proofs appear in the appendix.
Our model is directly related to papers in two separate literatures. First, it is con-
nected to the models that show the consequences of prospect-theory-like behavior in
broad economic models; second, it is connected to the models in development economics
that study the role of aspirations and their impact on growth. Within the first group,
Koszegi and Rabin (2009) and Bowman et al. (1999) analyze the consequence of reference-
dependent behavior in a consumption-saving model. As opposed to our work, however,
their focus is on the case in which the reference point is the agent’s past behavior, in-
stead of the average choice of the rest of the society. From this point of view, our model
could be seen as providing another analysis of the consequences of reference-dependent
behavior in broad economic setting, where a different origin for the reference point is
considered.
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Within the development literature, formal models that study the role of aspirations
appear in Banerjee (1990), Genicot and Ray (2009), Dalton and Ghosal (2009 (Forthcom-
ing)), and Mookherjee et al. (2010). Mookherjee et al. (2010) studies the case in which
agents look at their ‘neighbors’ to form their aspirations – i.e. they focus on a ‘local’
origin of aspirations, instead of a society-wide origin like we do. (Furthermore, they use
a functional form very different from prospect theory.) Genicot and Ray (2009) studies
an OLG model in which subjects live one period and are reference-dependent, with a
utility function, differentiable everywhere, which is convex in an interval right before the
aspirations level. They first show that there exists an inverse U effect of aspirations on
accumulation decision, proving the conjecture in Ray (2006). Then, focusing on the case
in which aspirations are the average income of the society, they show that the support of
the wealth distribution in steady state is generically finite, and that, under the condition
that aspirations are, loosely speaking, ‘important enough,’ a distribution of perfect equal-
ity cannot exist. In addition, they also consider the case of ‘upward looking’ aspirations,
i.e. the case in which each individual’s aspirations are the average income of those above
her in the income distribution, and show that in this case continuous income distributions
can exist in a steady state if and only if they are Pareto distributions. By contrast, in our
paper we focus only on the case in which aspirations are the average income of the society,
but consider a utility function which not only has an area of convexity, but also admits
a kink at a reference point – directly following prospect theory and the notion of loss
aversion. This feature allows us obtain our different results on the long run distribution
of endowment: that the distribution becomes, and remains, either of perfect equality or
polarized, therefore also admitting the case of continuous support. (In our model these
features are reached in finite time, as opposed to in the steady state.) Furthermore, it
also allows us to characterize the effects of the initial distribution on growth.
Finally, our work is naturally connected also with the literature in macroeconomics
that is usually referred to as keeping up with the Joneses, that models agents whose
utility for consumption depends also on the relative position of the agent in the wealth
distribution (their status). (An analysis closer to the one in our work appears in Konrad
(1992), Fershtman et al. (1996), Rauscher (1997), Corneo and Jeanne (2001), Cooper
et al. (2001), Stark (2006), Hopkins and Kornienko (2006).) Their approach, however,
is fundamentally different from ours for two reasons. First, these models assume that
individuals care about their status using some additive or multiplicative functional form,
which renders the model very different from assuming that subjects care about how their
income relate to the average one using a prospect-theory form. Second, most of these
works focus more on the properties of the accumulation path than on the implications
on the wealth distribution in the long run – as evident from the fact that most use a
representative agent. By contrast, the development of the wealth distribution, and its
effects on growth, are the essential focus of our study.
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2. A Model of Growth with Aspirations
2.1 Formal Setup
We study an economy with overlapping generations and warm glove preferences. The
economy is populated by a continuum of size L of agents who live for two periods, make
choices in the first period, generate an offspring exogenously in the second period, and
have a bequest motive directly in the utility function.4 Every agent is endowed with eit
of human capital and kit of physical capital, which are determined by the decision taken
by the previous generation. We assume constant return to scale in the accumulation
of human capital, i.e. by investing eit+1 households obtain Aeit+1, and without loss of
generality we put A = 1. Since our interest is mostly related to developing countries,
we impose that the access to credit market is restricted: individual consumers cannot
borrow. (We will later argue that this assumption does not seem to be what is driving
our results. See Remark 2.) By β ≤ 1 we denote the discount factor; µt stands for the
distribution of endowments in each period; rt and wt represent the interest rate and the
wage. Finally, in the economy we have a representative firm with a production function
F (K,H).
The individual household maximizes:
maxci,t,xi,t+1,ei,t+1,ki,t+1 u(cit) + βv(xi,t+1, x¯i,t+1)
such that
ci,t + ei,t+1 + ki,t+1 ≤ wtei,t + (1 + rt)ki,t
xi,t+1 = wtei,t+1 + (1 + rt)ki,t+1
(1)
As opposed to standard OLG problems, the agent’s utility for the second period, v,
can be different from the one of the first period, u. In particular, the former also depends
on an additional term, x¯i,t, which we will interpret as the agent’s aspirations for period
t.
We start by imposing standard restrictions.
Assumption 1. u(·) is increasing and concave at satisfies the Inada conditions.
Assumption 2. The production function F (K,H) is increasing, concave, homogeneous
of degree one, and satisfies the Inada conditions.
Both requirement above are standard. In particular, agents have a standard utility
function in the first period of their lives. (In Section 4 we will also consider the more
specific case in which u exhibits Constant Relative Risk Aversion, CRRA.) The main
feature of our model is the shape of v.
Assumption 3. There exist a H > 0 such that for every x¯ ∈ R+, the following holds:
4The presence of an uncountable number of agents is inessential for our results. It is routine to show
that everything we prove would hold true with finitely many agents.
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1. v is continuous and monotone: v(·, x¯) is strictly monotone and continuos; v(x, ·) is
continuous for every x ∈ R+;
2. v moves like u when not close to the aspirations : for all x /∈ [c¯ − H, c¯], v(x, x¯) is
twice differentiable and dv(x|x¯)
dx
= du(x)
dx
;
3. v has a prospect-theory form:
(a) v is strictly convex on (x¯−H, x¯);
(b) limx→x¯− v(x, x¯) > limx→x¯+ v(x, x¯).5
The idea behind Assumption 3 is that our agents have an aspirations level x¯i, which
acts as a reference point in affecting their behavior. This reference point affects the second
period utility v in two ways, both of which are the fundamental features of prospect theory
(part (3) of Assumption 3):
1. v is steeper for gains than for losses, and in particular it is not differentiable at
v(x¯, x¯): this generates the well-known effect called ‘loss-aversion,’ and is motivated
by the different approach that subjects have to losses as opposed to gains with
respect to the reference point.
2. v is convex below the aspirations level, and concave above it : this feature, which
leads to the so-called ‘diminishing sensitivity,’ is motivated by the fact that the
marginal change in gain-loss sensations is greater the closer we get to the reference
point. (Notice that v is strictly concave after x¯, since there it coincides with u.)
(See, among others, Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1991, 1992)
for more discussion on these properties.) While reference-dependent, we assume that v
remains ‘well-behaved:’ the presence of a reference point does not render the function
discontinuous or not-monotone (part (1)). Moreover, as opposed to what usually assumed
in prospect theory, we posit that the reference point affects the agents’ utility in the area
‘close to’ the aspiration level, but not if ‘far below:’ we posit that there exists a positive
H such that v is not subject to reference-effects (it coincides with u) for levels of x below
x¯−H (part (2)). The rationale of this restriction is that reference effects are the strongest
in the area immediately preceding the reference point, but then they tend to fade, all the
way to disappearance, as we get further below. At the same time, we posit that when the
reference point is reached subjects should go back to their standard behavior: v becomes
concave and behaves like u (part (2)).
Because v depends on the aspirations, but u does not, then with Assumption 1 and
3 we are imposing that households are reference dependent only in the second period
of their life – the reference point affects how they value the income later in their life,
and their bequest. Conversely, they are not reference dependent when they are young.
This approach is motivated by the observation that individuals tend to set objectives
5By limx→x¯− v(x, x¯) we understand the limit of v(x, x¯) as x approaches x¯ from below. (The limit
from above is defined analogously.)
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for themselves to be accomplished when they have reached a certain age, or for their
offsprings to reach, as opposed to for their young age. That is, that the accomplishment
of life goals tends to be evaluated only in the later part of life. (A similar approach
appears in Mookherjee et al. (2010) and Genicot and Ray (2009).)
Thus far in our analysis we have not imposed any restriction on the origin of agent’s
aspirations. In this paper we choose to focus on a very specific source for the aspirations:
we restrict our attention to the case in which the aspirations level for income in period t
is the average income of the society as a whole in period t. (Denote by µt the distribution
of endowments at time t.)
Assumption 4. For i ∈ I, t ∈ T , x¯i,t =
∫
I
xi,tµt(x)di.
With Assumption 4 we are ruling out the case in which aspirations are affected by
the income of the parents, a` la Koszegi and Rabin (2009), or of the neighbors, a` la
Mookherjee, Napel, and Ray (2010). Our focus on this special case is motivated by our
interest in understanding the effect of this society-wide reference-dependence.
2.2 Notion and multiplicity of equilibria
One of the features of the economy described above is that each agent’s utility depends
on the behavior of the other members of the economy. Since the different agents decides
simultaneously, the expectations of each agent on the behavior of others will play an
essential role: agents are best reacting to what they expect others to do. In line with
this, we focus our attention on the following (standard) kind of equilibria.
Definition 1. An equilibrium of the economy is a sequence of consumption decisions,
bequest decisions, and factor prices
e = {{cit}i∈L, {xit+1}i∈L, wt, rt}∞t=0
such that factor markets clear and (cit, xit+1) solves (1) for all i ∈ L and for all t.
Definition 1 is a standard notion of equilibrium. Notice that by using this definition
together with Assumption 4, we are implicitly assuming that subjects can correctly fore-
cast the behavior of others: in fact, aspirations are defined as the average of the true
income distribution in the second period of the agents’ life, but affect their behavior
already in the first – which implicitly implies that households can correctly forecast it.6
It is standard practice to show that one such equilibrium exists for any economy
that satisfies Assumptions 1-4. As opposed to the case without aspirations, however, the
economy described in Section 2.1 will not admit a unique equilibrium. Rather, equilibria
will be ‘deeply’ non-unique: the presence of aspirations, by rendering the agent’s utility
6Alternatively, we could have defined the aspirations as the expectations of the distribution in the fu-
ture period, and added the requirement that in equilibrium such expectations are correct and degenerate.
The two approaches are clearly identical.
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dependent on the behavior of others, introduces obvious coordination issues. To see why,
consider the simplest possible case: an economy in which all agents start with the same
endowment in the first period. In this simple case, all agents have the same aspirations,
and face the same problem: they will then choose the same consumption plan.7 And
since all households have the same consumption, they will all reach their aspirations –
they will all invest exactly what needed to reach the average endowment. The problem
is, however, that how high this endowment will be depends on the future behavior of the
other households. Consider for example some equilibrium in which all households choose
some a > 0 in the second period (and each of them knows that this will happen). Then,
consider some alternative equilibrium in which, instead, each household knows that all
others agents will choose a+  (where  is small and positive). In this latter case, if one
household were to consume only a, it would fall short of its aspirations: as long as  is
small it might choose instead to save a little more in the first period so that to reach the
rest of the society – and so its aspirations. And since this can be true for all agents, then
everybody will in fact choose a+  – guaranteeing that this is an equilibrium. Naturally
this is true only as long as  is ‘small’: there will be some ¯ large enough such that, even
if every agent knew that everyone else will consume a + ¯, they’d rather fail to reach
their aspirations and consume only a. And since this will be true for everybody, then
the average consumption will be only a – and thus there cannot be an equilibrium with
second-period consumption a + ¯, for ¯ arbitrarily large. In the analysis that follows we
will therefore analyze the features of the set of possible equilibria of the economy.
Before we proceed, let us briefly add two small remarks, one about some simple
features of the growth path and of the optimal individual solution, and one about the
role of credit constraints for our results.
Remark 1. Since there exists two assets (human and physical capital) and given the
assumption on the production function, at every t we must have wt = 1 + rt. Then the
household problem simplifies to the choice of It+1 to maximize:
max
It+1
u(xit − It+1) + βv(wt It+1) (2)
As customary define Kt =
∫
L
kitdi, Ht =
∫
L
eitdi, λt =
Kt
Ht
and f(λt) = F (Kt, Ht)/Ht.
(Notice that by Assumption 2 there are constant returns to scale.) By the arbitrage
condition above, and since factor rental prices are equal to the marginal productivity at
every t, we must have
f ′(λt) = f(λt)− f ′(λt)λt. (3)
By Assumption 2 there exists a unique λ which satisfies (3), since the LHS is always
decreasing and the right hand side always increasing.
As a result, the economy is in balanced growth path since period zero and the growth
rate of the economy is equal to the growth rate of investment. From now on, we use
w∗ = f(λ∗)− f ′(λ∗)λ∗ to indicate the wage rate at every t.
7Notice that this requires that subjects cannot make different choices when indifferent. This is proved
in Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
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Remark 2. Since we are mostly interested in the role of aspirations for developing
countries, where credit constraints are binding, we have chosen to focus on the case in
which access to credit markets is restricted. However, this restriction does not seem to be
what is driving our result. In fact, the most important point in our setup is the possibility
for households to be in ‘aspiration failure,’ i.e. have a second-period consumption below
the aspirations. We will now show that even if we remove any restriction in the access
to credit, households might still choose be in ‘aspirations failure’ – leading to results
qualitatively similar to the ones we discuss.
Assume an economy as described above, but with no credit constraints, and notice
that the households problem (2) can be re-written as (define g to be the return on bonds)
max
It+1,bt
u(xit − It+1 + bit) + βv(wtIt+1 − gtbt)). (4)
If we compute the FOCs with respect to It+1 and bt, we get:
u′(xit − It+1 + bit) = βwtv′(wtIt+1 − gtbt))
u′(xit − It+1 + bit) = βgv′(wtIt+1 − gtbt)) (5)
which implies g = wt = w
∗. The problem is then determined in the difference I − b. It
is then easy to see that, if w∗(I − b) = x¯it+1 and if
u′(xit − x¯it+1/w∗) + lim
x′→x¯−it+1
βw∗v′(x′) > 0 (6)
then the optimal choice of the household is to be in aspirations failure, as sought.
2.3 Properties of the optimal behavior
Because of the convexity and non-differentiability of the second-period utility function,
the behavior of households in this economy will be different from that in the standard
model. To better express its features, let us define the optimal choice of an household
in the second period as a function of the initial endowment and aspiration level:8 define
φ : R++ × R++ → R++ such that xi,t+1 = φ(e, x¯) is an optimal solution of (1) for an
household i with initial endowment e and aspirations x¯. Then, the following must hold.
Proposition 1. The following holds for all x¯:
1. there exists γ ∈ R, γ > 0 such that for all e ∈ R++, φ(e, x¯) /∈ (x¯t − γ; x¯t);
2. there exist some e, e¯ ∈ R++, e < e¯ such that φ(e, x¯) = x¯ for all e ∈ (e, e¯).
8To be precise, this map should also depend on the other elements of the economy, like rt and wt.
We omit them from the notation for simplicity.
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Proposition 1 shows two features of the optimal solution of the household problem.
Part (1) shows that there is an interval (of positive measure) of second period income,
right before the aspirations level x¯, that will not be chosen by any household with as-
pirations x¯, irrespectively of their initial endowment. Put differently, no household will
choose a second-period income too close below the aspirations: either they reach their
aspirations, or they fall short of them of a non-trivial amount. This is naturally due to
the fact that v is convex in an interval that ends in x¯. As we shall see, this has important
consequences on the aggregate behavior of the economy.
Part (2) of Proposition 1 shows another features of the optimal behavior: there is a
non-zero interval of initial endowments such that the optimal choice for households with
those endowments is the same and equal to the aspirations level. That is, many different
households, with many different initial endowments, will choose to consume exactly same
amount in the second period, equal to the aspirations.
3. Aspirations, Distribution and Frustration in the Long Run
3.1 Distribution in the long run
We now turn to study the distribution of our economy in the long run. We start with
two (standard) definitions: polarized distribution and perfect equality.
Definition 2. A distribution µ on R+ is of perfect equality if µ(x) = 1 for some x ∈ R+.
Definition 3. A distribution µ on R+ is polarized around a if there exist x1, x2 ∈ R+,
x1 < a ≤ x2 such that:
1. µ([0, x1)) > 0 and µ([x2,+∞)) > 0;
2. µ(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [x1, x2].
A distribution is of perfect equality if it is degenerate. By contrast, a distribution is
polarized if it has a “gap” of positive measure. In particular, a distribution is polarized
around its mean if it has this “gap” in the middle, to divide those above the mean on
the one side, from the those below the mean on the other. It turns out that, in the
presence of aspirations, these two types of distributions are enough to describe the long
run behavior of any the economy that satisfy our assumptions. (By µet we denote the
distribution of endowment in equilibrium e and period t.)
Theorem 1. Consider an economy as described above that satisfies Assumptions 1-4,
and some equilibrium e of this economy. Then there exists some T ∈ N such that for all
t > T , one of the following must hold:
(a) µet is polarized around E[µt];
(b) µet is of perfect equality.
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Theorem 1 shows that the long run distribution of any equilibrium of any economy
that satisfy our assumptions can be of only two kinds: either polarized, or of perfect equal-
ity. No other distribution is possible – in particular, no continuous and non-degenerate
distributions are possible in the long run. Notice, moreover, that this is not an asymp-
totic result, or a property of the steady state. Rather, Theorem 1 shows that one of these
two types of distribution will be reached in finite time (at time T ), and will be stable:
after that time the economy will be, and forever remain, either polarized or of perfect
equality.
To analyze the implication of the theorem, recall that in the standard case in which
u and v are identical and concave, an economy that started with a continuous and non-
degenerate distribution of initial endowments could easily have an equilibrium in which
the distribution is continuous and non-degenerate in every period: for example, if u
exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), then any distribution is possible in the
long run if u = v and both are concave.9 By contrast, Theorem 1 shows that the the
presence of aspirations has a strong impact on the type of paths that are attainable
in equilibrium: no matter what the initial distribution is, and no matter how small
the impact of aspirations on utilities is, a continuous non-degenerate distribution is no
longer possible in the long run. Either the poor get “left behind,” failing to attain their
aspirations, and the society is polarized between those that attain their aspirations and
those that fail to. Or, everybody catches up with their aspirations – but this can happen
only if that the distribution of endowments is of perfect equality.
3.2 Origin of the long run distribution
Theorem 1 shows that in any equilibrium the long run distribution of endowments can
be of only two kinds, but it does not provide conditions as to when each of these two
cases take place. This is the content of the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Consider an economy as described above that satisfies Assumptions 1-4
with some initial distribution of the endowment µ0. Then each of the following must hold:
1. if µ0 is not degenerate, then there exists some equilibrium e and some T ∈ N, such
that for all t > T , µet is polarized around E[µet ];
2. there exists some δ ∈ R, δ > 0, such that, if
inf
x∈supp(µ0)
x
E(µ0) ≥ δ, then there exists an
equilibrium e, and some T ∈ N, such that for all t > T , µet is of perfect equality.
Proposition 2 shows that the distribution that the economy will assume in the long run
depends both on the initial conditions (µ0), and also on the equilibrium we are looking
9To see why, notice that in an economy like ours but in which u = v and both are strictly concave
and exhibit CRRA, the distribution of endowments is constant over time. (This is proved in Lemma 2
in the Appendix.) But this implies that the initial distribution is also the long run distribution, which
means that any long run distribution is possible.
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at. In particular, part (1) shows that any economy admits a long run equilibrium that
evolves into a polarized distribution, no matter what the initial distribution is (as long as
it is not degenerate). To get an intuition of why this is the case, notice that we can always
construct an equilibrium in which every member of the society with an endowment equal
or above the mean is expected to increase her consumption by at least some b, where b is
defined as the maximum amount that the household with an endowment exactly equal
to the mean is willing to increase her consumption to if she knew that the mean will
increase by b. In this equilibrium everyone with an endowment above or equal to the
mean will “keep up,” while the rest will not, generating polarization. If this is true in
every period this polarization will never disappear, leading to part (1) of the proposition.
On the other hand, part (2) of Proposition 2 shows that, if the initial distribution is
sufficiently “condensed,” i.e. the ratio between the minimum and the average income is
high (
inf
x∈supp(µ0)
x
E(µ0) ≥ δ), then this economy will also admit an equilibrium which evolves
into perfect equality in the long run. The reason is, again, very simple: if the poor are
not too much behind the average, as time goes by they will have time to catch up –
leading to perfect equality.
4. Growth
4.1 Comparative Growth
We now turn to investigate the relation between inequality and growth in the presence
of reference-effects. It is well known that with standard preference the relation between
inequality and growth is complex (see Aghion et al. (1999)). In our simple setup, however,
if we remove any reference-effect (i.e. we posit u = v and both concave), and we focus on
CRRA utility, we get a unique growth rate regardless of the initial distribution.10 In this
section we will show that in our model with reference-dependence the initial distribution
will always affect the growth of the economy, even if the utility is CRRA. In particular,
we shall compare how the average income changes over time depending on the initial
distribution of the society, and on the equilibrium that we are looking at.
To better express these comparisons, let us introduce a few simple concepts. We begin
by saying that an equilibrium dominates another if the average endowment of the first is
above the average endowment of the other for every period starting from some period T :
that is, if there is a point in which the average income of the first surpasses, and stays
above, that of the latter. We shall use the symbol  () to express this (strict) relation.
Definition 4. For any equilibrium e of some economy E, and equilibrium e′ of some
economy E ′, we say e  e′ if there exists some T ∈ N such that for all t ≥ T we have∫
x
xµet (x)dx ≥
∫
x
xµet (x)dx.
10This is naturally not necessarily true for other utility functions. See Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
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We say that e  e′ if there exists some T ∈ N such that the inequality above is strict for
all t ≥ T .
Notice that the comparison  could also be seen also as a comparison of the average
growth rate of two economies that start from the same initial average endowment. (If we
have two economies E and E ′ with the same average endowment, and equilibria e of E
and e′ of E ′ such that e  e′, then in the long run not only the endowment, but also the
average growth rate of e is above that of e′.)
While  compares two specific equilibria, potentially of different economies, we now
introduce a comparative notion for all the equilibria of two economies. We define three
notions: B, Bmax, Bmin, to represent, respectively, full dominance, higher “best” equilib-
rium, and higher “worst” equilibrium. We start with “full dominance.”
Definition 5. For any economies E and E ′ we say that E B E ′ if for all equilibria e of
E, and e′ of E’, we have e  e′. We say E D E ′ if for all equilibria e of E, and e′ of E’,
we have e  e′.
The idea behind Definition 5 is that if one economy E “dominates” another economy
E ′ (E B E ′), then it means that every equilibrium of E dominates (in the sense of 
above) every equilibrium of E ′. This notion, however, is very demanding, since it requires
that even the worst of the equilibria of E strictly dominates the best of the equilibria of
E ′. Two weaker notions would compare the ‘best’ equilibrium of each economy, or the
‘worst’ one. This is what we do in the definition of Bmax and Bmin below.
Definition 6. For any economies E and E ′ we say that EBmax E ′ if there exists some e
of E such that e  e′ for all e′ of E ′. We say E Dmax E ′ if there exists some e of E such
that e  e′ for all e′ of E ′.
Definition 7. For any economies E and E ′ we say that E Bmin E ′ if there exists some
e′ of E ′ such that e  e′ for all e of E. We say that E Dmin E ′ if there exists some e′ of
E ′ such that e  e′ for all e of E.
We say that an economy Bmax-dominates another if its best equilibrium dominates (in
the sense of ) any equilibrium of the other economy. Conversely, we that an economy
Bmin-dominates another if even its worst equilibrium dominates (again in the sense of )
some equilibrium of the other.
Finally, in order to better express our results on growth, we compare the behavior
of four different types of economies, each of which is assumed to have the same average
initial endowment.
Definition 8. Denote by EO the set of economies that satisfy Assumptions 1, 2, v = u and
such that µo is of perfect equality. E1 is the set of economies that satisfy Assumption 1-4
and such that µo is of perfect equality. E2 is the set of economies that satisfy Assumptions
1-4, in which initial distribution is not of perfect equality, but there admits an equilibrium
e and some T ∈ N such that for all t ≥ T , µet is of perfect equality. E3 is the set of
economies that satisfy Assumptions 1-4, in which initial distribution is not of perfect
equality, and that admits no equilibrium e′ and some T ∈ N such that for all t ≥ T , µe′t
is of perfect equality.
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Economies in E0 is a standard economy with a representative agent who has a standard
concave utility function with no reference-effects. Economies in E1, E2, and E3, instead,
have households with aspirations as modeled in Assumptions 1-4. They differ from each
other because of the initial distribution: economies in E1 have an initial distribution with
perfect equality; those in E2 do not, but admits at least one equilibrium in which the
wealth distribution converges to perfect equality (in finite time); those in E3, instead
starts with a distribution with some inequality, and admit no equilibria in which the
inequality disappears. From Proposition 2 we know that we can think of economies in E2
as those in which we have some initial inequality, but in which the wealth distribution
is very ‘condensed’ – no household has an initial endowment too far below the mean
endowment. By contrast, an economy in E3 would be an economy in which the initial
distribution has a more acute inequality: there are households with initial endowments
far from the mean.
4.2 Growth in the ‘best’ equilibria
We are then ready for the first result on growth. Let us start by looking at the ‘best’
equilibria – those in which growth is the highest.
Theorem 2. Consider four economies E0 ∈ EO, E1 ∈ E1, E2,3 ∈ E2 ∪ E3 that have the
same initial average endowment. Then:
E1 Bmax E2,3 and E1 Bmax E0.
If u exhibit CRRA, then:
E1 Bmax E2,3 Dmax E0.
Theorem 2 shows that the presence of aspirations could have a strong impact on
growth depending on the initial distribution. First of all, it shows that there exists
an equilibrium of E1 that dominates all other equilibria of all other economies: the
equilibrium with the (strictly) highest growth amongst all is one of an economy with
aspirations and with an initial distribution of perfect equality. The intuition is simple:
with aspirations and perfect equality, agents could “push” each other into consuming
more, and since the distribution is of perfect equality, then by doing this there is no
subject that is “left behind” – leading to the highest growth. In this equilibrium, growth
will be strictly higher also of any equilibrium of the economy with no aspirations (E0):
the reason is, without aspirations we loose the mechanism of “pushing each other” which
was makes the growth so high in the case of E1. This growth will also be higher than the
growth with aspirations and initial inequality: in this case, the wealthy cannot expect
the society to increase the income too much, since they know that the poor would not
follow, and therefore they won’t increase their own income as much as they do in E1.
If we further assume that u exhibits constant relative risk aversion, then we obtain
the full, transitive rank: E1 Bmax E2,3 Dmax E0. That is, if we look at the best equilibria,
we have that the highest growth is found with aspirations and perfect equality, then
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with aspirations and initial inequality, and finally the economy with no aspirations. This
should be compared with what happens when there are no aspirations, and both u and
v are identical, concave, and CRRA: it is well known (we show it again in Lemma 2
in the Appendix) that in this case the growth rate is constant and independent of the
initial distribution. (Notice that this implies that the ranking above is true also for some
E ′0 which, like E0, has no aspirations, but that has an initial distribution which is not
necessarily of perfect equality.) That is: the presence of aspirations is always positive,
but it renders growth dependent of the initial distribution, where the presence of initial
inequality is actually harmful for growth.
This discussion shows a feature of society-influenced reference-dependence. On the
one hand, it induces households to ‘push each other,’ generating growth. On the other
hand, this mechanism works only insofar as households are not ‘too far’ from each other
– if they are, this mechanism would not work.
4.3 Comparative growth in all equilibria
Theorem 2 analyzes the ranking only for the ‘best’ equilibria. It turns out that things
can be quite different in other equilibria.
Theorem 3. Consider four economies E0 ∈ EO, E1 ∈ E1, E2 ∈ E2, and E3 ∈ E3 that have
the same average initial endowment. Then the following holds:
1. E1 D E0;
2. for any equilibrium e of E0, there exists some equilibrium e
′ of E1 such that
µet = µ
e′
t .
Moreover, if u exhibits CRRA, then:
4. E2 B E0;
5. E2 Bmin E1;
6. E3 D E0;
7. E3 Dmin E1.
Theorem 3 considers other equilibria besides those with highest growth. First, it
shows that the presence of aspirations never reduces growth: every equilibrium of E1
must grow at least as much as any equilibrium of E0 (E1 DE0); and if u is CRRA, then
also any equilibria of E2 and E3 grow more than that E0 (E2 B E0 and E3 D E0). In
fact, equilibria in E2 strictly dominate all equilibria in E0. At the same time, however,
the presence of aspirations is not sufficient to have a higher growth: for example, there
are equilibria of E1 in which the wealth distribution coincides in every period with that
of the (unique) equilibrium of E0.
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Also in the comparison between E1, E2, and E3, the ranking in Theorem 3 is quite
different from the one in Theorem 2. While in the latter we have seen that the economy
with the highest growth in the best equilibrium is E1, Theorem 3 shows that, if u is
CRRA, then a society with a small amount of initial inequality (E2) has a lowest-growth
equilibrium that grows strictly more than the lowest-growth equilibrium of a society with
initial perfect equality (E1): we have E2 Bmin E1. Moreover, we also have that E2 B E0:
the presence of a little bit of inequality renders minimal growth strictly higher also of
the case with no reference-effects. The intuition is that, with aspirations, the households
that are right below the average income might choose to ‘push up,’ and reach their
aspirations – generating growth. And since this cannot happen with perfect equality or
with no aspirations, then we have that the minimal growth of an economy of type E2
must lie strictly above that of an economy of type E2 or E0. A similar argument suggests
why we have E3 Dmin E0, and E3 Dmin E1. (Here the inequality is weak, D, since there
could be no subjects who ‘push up’ of the kind described above.11)
The results of Theorems 2 and 3 can then be summarized as follows: the presence of
aspirations can only increase the growth rate with respect to the case of no aspirations.
Depending on the initial distribution of the economy, the growth rate will be strictly
higher (as is the case if the initial range is small enough), or identical at least for some
equilibria (as is the case for initial perfect equality). If we compare the growth rates
between economies with aspirations but different initial distributions, we find that the
results depend strictly on the equilibrium we are looking at: economies that have an
initial distribution with perfect equality have equilibria with a growth rate strictly higher
than any other economy; at the same time, they also have minimal equilibria that are
worse than the minimal equilibria of any other economy – strictly worse than the minimal
equilibria of E2. A graphical intuition of the results appears in Figure 4.3, which represent
the set of average growth rates for all equilibria of each type of economy. (Notice that
both the highest and the lowest growth rate for E3 could be either above or below those
of E2, albeit always (weakly) above that of E0. To represent this possibility, we Figure
4.3 contains the lighter shade area for E3.).
5. Conclusion
In this paper we study a warm glove OLG model in which agents’ utility on bequest
depends on the the average income of the rest of society, which will act as a reference-
point. In line with this interpretation, we model this reference-dependence using the
standard prospect theory form. We argue that this leads to multiple equilibria. We show
that in any of these equilibria the wealth distribution will converge (in finite time) to be
either polarized or of perfect equality. We then turn to study the growth rate of different
societies, and show that a society that starts from perfect equality is the one that has
the equilibrium that grows the most, followed by a society with initial inequality. At the
same time, if we look at equilibria with the lowest growth, then the society that grows
11That is, there could be no household with an endowment below but close to the average one.
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Figure 1 Average growth rates for different equilibria of economies E0, E1, E2, E3 when u is CRRA
the most is the one with a small amount of initial inequality. Finally, we show that any
society with reference-effects, no matter what the initial distribution is, grows more than
any society without aspirations.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Preliminary Results
Lemma 1. For all equilibria e, if µeT is of perfect equality, then µ
e
t is of perfect equality ∀t ≥ T .
Proof. Assume that µT is of perfect equality. We claim that xi,T+1 = E[µT+1] for all i ∈ L. By
means of contradiction, assume instead that there exists i ∈ L such that xi,T+1 6= E[µT+1]. If we have
xi,T+1 > E[µT+1], there must also exist some j ∈ I such that E[µT+1] > xj,T+1, by definition of E[µT+1].
Assume then WLOG that we have xi,T+1 > E[µT+1] > xj,T+1 for some i, j ∈ L. Notice that for both i
and j we must have that the optimal solution meets the FOCS, i.e. u′(xT −xi,T+1/w∗) = βw∗v′(xi,T+1)
and u′(xT − xi,T+1/w∗) = βw∗v′(xi,T+1). By Assumption 1 and 3, for xi,T+1 < xj,T+1 we have that
βv′(xj,T+1) < βw∗v′(xi,T+1) which implies that u′(·) is increasing between xT − xj,T+1 and xT − xi,T+1
which violates Assumption 1, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 2. If u = v and u is CRRA, the growth rate of the economy is unique and invariant. At the
same time, there exists a strictly concave u such that this is not true.
Proof. Consider the first order condition for (2) imposing u(·) = v(·) (internal solution is guarantee by
Assumption 1) and substitute xit+1 = ψitxit, we get:
−u′
(
xit
(
1− ψit
w∗
))
+ βw∗u′(xitψit) = 0 (7)
applying the implicit function theorem we get:
dψit
dxit
= −
−
(
1− ψitw∗
)
u′′
(
xit
(
1− ψitw∗
))
+ βw∗u′′(xitψit)ψit(
xit
w∗
)
u′′
(
xit
(
1− ψitw∗
))
+ βw∗u′′(xitψit)xit
(8)
where the sign is not a priori guaranteed and is clearly dependent on the expression at numerator.
Substituting for u(x) = c
1−θ
1−θ it can be easily checked that the growth rate is unique and invariant
to the distribution.
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
To prove both points consider the household problem 1, and notice that the FOC are
lim
x′→x¯−it+1
βw∗v′(x′) ≥ u′
(
xit − xit+1
w∗
)
≥ lim
x′→x¯+it+1
βw∗v′(x′)
.
Notice that if no x ∈ (0, x¯it+1) satisfy them, the claim is trivially true. Otherwise, define xα the
highest x ∈ (0, x¯it+1) that satisfies the FOC. (The existence of xα is guaranteed by standard arguments.)
By Assumption 3, for all  > 0 we must have −u′(x − xα/w∗ − /w∗) + βw∗v′(xα + ) > 0 and
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−u′(x− xα/w∗ + /w∗) + βw∗v′(xα − ) < 0, which implies that xα cannot be a maximum since it fails
the second order conditions (recall that since x < x¯it+1, the function is differentiable at xα). In turns,
this implies that x¯it+1 is an optimal solution for all initial endowments x such that u′(x− x¯it+1/w∗) ∈
[limx′→x¯+it+1 βw
∗v′(x′), limI′→I¯− βw∗v′(x′)].
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1
We start by noticing that, from period 1 onwards, the distribution of endowments must be either
polarized, or of perfect equality. To see why, consider any initial distribution µ0, and notice that by
Proposition 1 we know that there exists some γ > 0 such that µ((E[µ1]1 − γ,E[µ1]1)) = 0. This implies
that, if µ1([0,E[µ1])) > 0, then µ1([0,E[µ1] − γ)) > 0. Notice also that, by construction, we must have
that µ1([E[µ1],+∞)) > 0. Therefore, if µ1([0,E[µ1])) > 0, then the distribution is polarized around
E[µ1]. Conversely, if µ1([0,E[µ1])) = 0, then we must have µ1({E[µ1]}) = 1 (every distribution with a
support above its average must be degenerate). We have therefore proved that µ1 can be either polarized
around E[µ1], or of perfect equality. An identical argument shows that the same would hold true for all
µt for all t.
We are only left to show that there exists some T¯ from which the distribution is either of perfect
equality, or polarized. Notice that, if µt is of perfect equality, so will be µt+1. Therefore if there exists
some T such that µT is of perfect equality, then we can set T¯ = T . Otherwise, if such T does not exist,
we can set T¯ = 1, since we have proved that µ1 is polarized if it is not of perfect equality. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
1) Consider some non-degenerate µt, and notice that if µt is not continuous at its mean, then it must be
polarized. Otherwise, consider some µ0 which is continuous around its mean , and consider the equilib-
rium in which each i at time t chooses maxI′t+1
{
I ′t+1 ∈ arg maxIt+1 u(x0 − It+1) + βv(wt It+1|wt I∗t+1)
}
.
Then there exists some xit such that limI′→I¯− βw∗v′(w∗I ′, w∗I ′) = u′(xit− I¯). Notice that we must have
that xit is in the interior of the support of µt, otherwise this would violate Assumption 4 (aspirations
are equal the average income).
This xit should not stay on the lower bound of the support because it will violates Assumption 4.
But then ∀xjt < xit, household j will not reach her aspirations, and by Proposition 1 the distribution
will be polarized. Since t has been chosen arbitrarily, this proves the first part of the proposition.
2) By Proposition 1, we know that there exists an interval S ⊆ R+ such that ∀x′ ∈ S, x¯ = φ(x′, x¯).
This clearly implies that if supp(µ0) ⊆ S, then µ1 is of perfect equality. By Lemma 1 we also know that
it will remain in perfect equality for all t. We can define δ > 0 implicitly as any δ > 0 such that
min
x∈supp(µ0)
x
E(µ0)
≥ δ ⇒ Supp(µ0) ⊆ S.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2 and 3
Consider four economies E0 ∈ EO, E1 ∈ E1, E2 ∈ E2, and E3 ∈ E3 that have the same average initial
endowment. Call e0 the unique equilibrium of E0, and xe0t , . . . , the average endowments in e0 at period
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t. Then, the following holds.
Claim 1. For all t > 0, there exists a compact, convex, and positive-measure set St such that for all
equilibria e of E1, E[µet ] ∈ St. Moreover, for all t > 0 we have xe0t ∈ St and xe0t ≤ x′t, ∀ x′ ∈ St.
Proof. Notice first that in any equilibrium of E1 the distribution must remain of perfect equality in all
periods by Lemma 1. Then, in every period every household must choose a consumption exactly equal
to her aspirations, which implies that in all equilibria we must have xi,t = φ(xi,t−1, xi,t) for all i ∈ L,
for all t. In turns, this means that we have x¯t+1 such that limx′→x¯−t+1 βw
∗v′(x′) ≥ u′(x − x¯t+1/w∗) ≥
limx′→x¯+t+1 βw
∗v′(x′). Since the two limits are finite, by Assumption 1 E1 has a set of equilibrium
solutions such that at every t > 0 the optimal x∗t belong to a compact convex set St. In turns, this
implies that St is a set of positive measure for all t.
Notice that xe0t satisfies first order conditions as an interior point by Assumption 1. Consider now
x′t ∈ St. Assume that x′t < xe0t . By Assumption 4, the aspirations level should be equal to x′t. Since
by Assumption 3 the representative agents in E0 and E1 have the same utility outside an interval the
highest point of which is the aspirations, then between x′t and x
e0
t the u′(·) must be either constant or
increasing and decreasing. But this contradicts Assumption 1.
We are left to show that xe0t ∈ St. Assume by contradiction that the xmint defined as u′(xt−1 −
xmint /w
∗) = limx→xmin−t βw
∗v′(x) is such that xmint > x
e∗0
t . This implies u′(xt−1− xe
∗
0
t /w
∗) < βw∗v′(xe
∗
0
t )
but since u′ = v′ above the aspiration level, xmint is a stationary point of the problem without aspirations,
which implies a violation of Assumption 1. 
Notice that Claim 1 implies E1 Dmax E0. This, together with the observation above that St has
positive measure for all t, implies that E1BmaxE0. (The reason is, E1 has multiple equilibria with different
growth, and all of them have a growth weakly above E0; but then, there must exist an equilibrium with
a growth strictly above E0.) In turns, Claim 1 also proves points (1) and (2) of Theorem 3.
We will now show that E1BmaxE for all E ∈ E2∪E3. Denote by e1 and e the equilibria of maximum
expansion of E1 and E, respectively. Also, denote et the equilibrium of maximum expansion of an
economy which in period t has the same average endowment as e, but has perfect equality at time t,
i.e. an economy of type E1 such that µett (E[µet ]) = 1. We will first of all show that et has an average
consumption that grows strictly more than e between time t and time t+1 for all t such that µet is not of
perfect equality. (If µet is of perfect equality then e and et coincide.). To see why, consider first the case
in which µet+1 is of perfect equality. By definition of maximum rate of expansion, E[µ
et
t+1] = maxx′{x′ ∈
arg maxy u(E[µ
et
t ] − y/w∗) + βv(y, y)}. We claim that E[µet+1] ≤ maxx′{x′ ∈ arg maxy u(E[µet ] −
y/w∗) + βv(y, y)} where the inequality is strict if µet is not of perfect equality. If this were not the
case, there would exist i ∈ L such that xei,t+1 = maxx′{x′ ∈ arg maxy u(xi,t − y/w∗) + βv(y, y)}. This,
however, would mean that then the distribution is not of perfect equality, which is a contradiction. Then
xet+1 < maxx′{x′ ∈ arg maxy u(E[µet ] − y/w∗) + βv(y, y)}, proving that if µet+1 is of perfect equality
then et has an average consumption that grows strictly more than e.
Consider now the case in which µet+1 is not of perfect equality.
Fix some t ≥ 0, and consider x¯ ∈ R++ such that E[µet+1] = maxx′{x′ ∈ arg maxy u(x¯ − y/w∗) +
βv(y, y)}. This x¯ should be strictly greater than the lower bound of the support and strictly less than
the higher bound by definition of polarized distribution.
Claim 2. x¯ < E[µet ]
Proof. By contradiction, assume x¯ ≥ E[µet ]. Then by definition of x¯, all the income strictly lower should
determine failure of aspirations, i.e. ∀j ∈ L such that xjt < x¯ we have xj,t+1 < E[µet+1]. Consider now
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k ∈ L such that xkt > x¯, and notice that either xk,t+1 = E[µet+1], or xk,t+1 = γ(xkt)xkt > E[µet+1],
where the growth rate γ(xkt) is defined by −u′
(
x− xγ(x)w∗
)
+ βw∗v′(xγ(x)|xγ′) = 0. (Notice that this
last expression is twice differentiable.) Then, notice that we must have
dγ(x)
dx
=
βw∗ dv
′(xγ(x)|xγ′)
dxγ′ γ
′
−
[
−u′′
(
x− xγ(x)w∗
)
x
w∗ + βw
∗v′(xγ(x)|xγ′)x
] ≤ 0. (9)
Call γ∗ = E[µ
e
t+1]
x¯ , we have:
E[µet+1] =
∫
j∈L | xjt<x¯
xjt+1dµt+1 +
∫
k∈L | xkt≥x¯
xkt+1dµt+1 =
< γ∗
∫
j∈L | xjt<x¯
xjtdµt + γ∗
∫
k∈L | xkt≥x¯
xktdµt = γ∗E[µet ]
where the inequality is determined by Proposition 1 and Equation (9). But then E[µet+1] < γ∗E[µet ] and
E[µet+1] = γ∗x¯ which is a contradiction since x¯ ≥ E[µet ]. This completes the proof. 
Since x¯ < E[µet ], then we have that E[µet+1] = maxx′{x′ ∈ arg maxy u(x¯ − y/w∗) + βv(y, y)} <
maxx′{x′ ∈ arg maxy u(E[µet ] − y/w∗) + βv(y, y)} = E[µett ], proving that also if µet+1 is not of perfect
equality, then et has an average consumption that grows strictly more than e.
We have therefore showed that et has an average consumption that grows strictly more than e
between time t and time t + 1 for all t such that µet is not of perfect equality. Observe also that if we
take two economies E′1, E
′′
1 ∈ E1 such that the initial endowment of E′1 is strictly higher than that of E′2,
then we have E′1 Bmax E′′1 . These two observations jointly imply E1 Bmax E for all E ∈ E2 ∪ E3.
We are left to analyze the case in which u is CRRA.
Claim 3. If u satisfies CRRA, then E3 D E0 and E2 B E0.
Proof. Notice first of all that E0 has a unique equilibrium E0, and that if u exhibits CRRA, then the
growth rate of E0 is constant, and use λ to define it. We need to prove that e never grows less than λ.
Call λ∗ the growth rate of E0 the first period, and divide the population L into four groups:
A: Subjects whose initial endowments is above or equal the average endowment;
B: Subjects whose initial endowments is below the average endowment, but who meet their aspira-
tions in the second period, i.e. φ(xi,0, x0(1 + λˆ)) = x0(1 + λˆ);
C: Subjects whose initial endowments is below the average endowment, and who do not meet their
aspirations in the second period but have a second period consumption in a point where v is
convex, i.e. φ(xi,0, x0(1 + λˆ)) ∈ [x0(1 + λˆ− γ, x0(1 + λˆ);
D: Subjects whose initial endowments is below the average endowment, and who do not meet their
aspirations in the second period but have a second period consumption in a point where v is
concave, i.e. φ(xi,0, x0(1 + λˆ)) < x0(1 + λˆ)− γ;
(Some of the groups above might be empty.) Define by λ∗i the growth rate of the average consumption
of each of the groups above, for i = A,B,C,D. Notice first of all that we must have λ∗A ≥ λ Notice
that every subjects in either group would increase her consumption of exactly λ if she had v = u
instead of being reference dependent. Now, if λ∗ ≤ λ, then if subjects of group (a) increased their
consumption of λ, they would remain strictly above their aspirations: but since above the aspirations
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u′ = v′, increasing the consumption of λ must remain optimal for them. Therefore, λ∗A ≥ λ. Consider
now subjects in B, and notice that they have an initial endowment below the average endowment, but
a second period consumption exactly equal to the mean. This means that subjects of group B must
have λ∗B > λ
∗. Consider now subjects in group C: were they not reference-dependent, they would
increase their consumption of λ. And, their second-period consumption must lead is in an area in
which the second period utility v is convex. But exactly since v is convex, they consume more in
the second period then they would have if they were not reference-dependent – v coincides with u
until a point after which is goes above u and becomes convex. Therefore, we must have λ∗C > λ.
Finally, consider the subjects in group D. Notice that, among them, we cannot have subjects such that,
if they increased their consumption of λ, they would have a second period consumption in a point
where v is convex, i.e. xi,0(1 + λ) ∈ [x0(1 + λˆ − γ, x0(1 + λˆ), but that instead increase it less, so
that φ(xi,0, x0(1 + λˆ)) < x0(1 + λˆ) − γ. The reason, just like subjects in group C, if increasing the
consumption of λ were optimal with no aspirations, it is even more so now, with aspirations, since v is
strictly above u from x0(1 + λˆ)− γ on. Therefore, the only subjects in group D must be those for whom
xi,0(1 + λ) < x0(1 + λˆ− γ. But since v coincides with u before x0(1 + λˆ− γ, then these subjects must
increase their consumption of at least λ.
We have just proved that: if λ∗ ≤ λ then λ∗A ≥ λ; λ∗B > λ∗; λ∗C ≥ λ; λ∗D ≥ λ. Clearly this implies
that we cannot have λ∗ < λ, hence λ∗ ≥ λ. Notice, moreover, that if group B were not empty, this
would imply λ∗ > λ.
The argument above must hold true for all periods, i.e. the growth rate of e must be above λ for all
periods. This means E3DE0 and E2DE0. We are left to show that E2BE0. To see why, notice that E2
is characterized by the fact that, at some period t, group B above must be non-empty – the distribution
must become of perfect equality, which implies that is a period in which some subjects ‘jump’ from being
below to being at the average consumption. We have already argued that this implies that the growth
rate must then be strictly above λ, proving the claim. 
Finally, notice that Claim 3 together with (2) imply (4) and (6) of Theorem 3. Q.E.D.
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